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ABSTRACT 
Scholarship on Emerson to date has not considered Spinoza’s influence upon his 
thought.  Indeed, from his lifetime until the twentieth century, Emerson’s friends and 
disciples engaged in a concerted cover-up because of Spinoza’s hated name.  However, 
Emerson mentioned his respect and admiration of Spinoza in his journals, letters, 
lectures, and essays, and Emerson’s thought clearly shows an importation of ideas central 
to Spinoza’s system of metaphysics, ethics, and biblical hermeneutics.  In this essay, I 
undertake a biographical and philosophical study in order to show the extent of Spinoza’s 
influence on Emerson and how this changes the traditional understanding of Emerson’s 
thought.   
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I.  Introduction 
Despite similarities in their cosmologies and theologies, no systematic analysis of Baruch 
Spinoza’s influence on Ralph Waldo Emerson yet exists.  The secondary literature on Emerson 
to date either ignores Spinoza completely or casually dismisses him as not germane to Emerson’s 
philosophy.  However, even some early critics and reviewers of Emerson recognize his 
connection to Spinoza.  The prominent poet and physician, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Sr., for 
instance, in his biography of Emerson, likens him to Spinoza as a “God-intoxicated man” (132-
3).  Similarly, in a review in praise of Emerson’s Essays: First Series, an anonymous author 
under the pseudonym ‘Disciple’ recognizes Spinoza’s influence on Emerson and sees Emerson 
as continuing in the same tradition (Burkholder 107).  Even some of Emerson’s most outspoken 
and maledictive critics compare Spinoza and Emerson in attempts to imprecate the New England 
Transcendentalist movement.  Such attempts, though made unjustly in order to charge Emerson 
with atheism, have some element of truth in their associating him with Spinoza.1  Andrews 
Norton, the prominent nineteenth century Unitarian minister, wrote A Discourse on the Latest 
Form of Infidelity (1839) disparaging Emerson as an atheist in the same vein as Spinoza.  While 
fundamentally misguided in his criticism, Norton nevertheless correctly observes similarities 
between them. 
Throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Spinoza evoked heated reactions 
from both critics and supporters.  Critics accused Spinoza of atheism and fatalism while 
supporters emphasized the relevance of God in his philosophy.  From denouncement by Pierre 
                                                          
1 From his lifetime until the late nineteenth century, many viewed Spinoza as an atheist and dismissed him on those 
grounds.  Spinoza’s name incited such controversy that his closest friends published his Opera Posthuma 
clandestinely under Spinoza’s initials (B.D.S.) in 1677, and in June of 1678 the government of Holland officially 
banned the sale of Spinoza’s works (Israel  289-94).  Moreover, even in Emerson’s time, Spinoza’s name invoked 
implications of atheism.   See the discussion below on the debate between Andrews Norton and George Ripley.     
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Bayle in the seventeenth century to Freidrich Heinrich Jacobi in the eighteenth Spinoza’s 
philosophy received no respite from contention.   
Bayle’s and Jacobi’s accusations had tremendous ramifications for Spinoza and his 
followers in his lifetime and through the late nineteenth century.  Especially because of his denial 
of miracles, “Spinoza’s philosophy provoked . . . consternation and outrage” (Israel 218).  Even 
though Holland did not ban Spinoza’s writings until 1678, legislation in 1653 gave “the city 
government . . . ample powers to inspect bookshops and sequestrate stocks of copies of . . . 
Spinoza’s Tractatus [Theologico-Politicus] and, intermittently at least, it plainly did so” (Israel 
273).   Indeed, Spinoza became the “model of infidelity and atheism for men who needed a 
whipping-boy in the philosophical and theological debates at the end of the seventeenth century 
and the beginning of the eighteenth” (Colie 26).   The protracted strife surrounding Spinoza’s 
name continued throughout Europe and the United States.   
As early as 1838 Emerson had read Bayle, Jacobi, and Johann Gottfried Herder, a famous 
defender of Spinoza (Cameron 47).  In his Journals, Emerson references Bayle specifically and 
expresses disapproval of Bayle’s treatment of philosophy in general.2  Aware of Spinoza’s 
unfavorable reception, Emerson did not react directly when Andrews Norton denounced the 
emerging Transcendentalist movement as Spinozist.  Rather, George Ripley, a friend to Emerson 
and fellow Unitarian minister, came to the defense, charging Norton with behavior contrary to 
the spirit of the Unitarian faith.      
In this spirit, those such as Emerson’s biographer Ralph Rusk have seen fit to dissociate 
Emerson and Spinoza.3  Even Holmes, though he compares the two thinkers on a superficial 
                                                          
2 See the section “Emerson on the Spinoza Controversy.”  
3 Rusk only mentions Emerson’s view of Spinoza once, explaining that “he vainly tried to catch Cabot’s enthusiasm 
for [Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph] Schelling and Spinoza.  He was naturally repelled by what seemed to him harsh 
mathematical logic” (308).  And indeed, Emerson does write this to his friend James Elliot Cabot, but he also 
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level, denies any substantive connection between them. 4 This understandable move to salvage 
Emerson’s reputation, however, has led to a gap in scholarship on Emerson concerning the 
relationship between these two venerable philosophers.  Indeed, considering Emerson’s many 
references to Spinoza and the degree to which he absorbed Spinozist ideas, any complete 
understanding of Emerson must account for his Spinozist leanings.  Many accounts of Emerson’s 
philosophical influences such as those by Ray Benoit and Stuart Brown emphasize his Platonism, 
but even these characterizations more aptly speak to Emerson’s Spinozist tendencies.          
Although Spinoza’s most striking influence on Emerson appears in Nature (1836), 
Spinozist ideas recur frequently in Emerson’s essays, lectures, journals, and correspondence.  
Perhaps because of Spinoza’s anathematic reputation, especially in the first half of the nineteenth 
century, Emerson remained relatively soft-spoken in his veneration of and borrowings from 
Spinoza.  However, on numerous occasions in his lectures and journals Emerson extols Spinoza, 
and his cosmological assertions express surprising similarities as well as marked differences to 
Spinoza’s system of metaphysics.  Furthermore, Emerson’s personal situation as a minister 
questioning the validity of religious ritual and doctrine mirrors Spinoza’s own conflict and  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
mentions Spinoza on numerous occasions in his journals, essays, and lectures, listing Spinoza as one of the 
Trismegisti: “that lofty and sequestered class who have been its [the laws of the intellect’s] prophets and oracles, 
high-priesthood of the pure reason…expounders of the principles of thought from age to age” (“Intellect,” Complete 
Works II 204).    
4 Holmes portrays Emerson as a poor scholar rather than one influenced by Spinoza or Spinozist ideas.  In an 
attempt at reassurance, Holmes offers comfort to those shocked by Emerson’s more controversial sources: “let no 
one be frightened away from his pages by the terrible names of Plotinus and Proclus and Porphyry, of Behmen or 
Spinoza, or of those modern German philosophers with whom it is not pretended that he had any intimate 
acquaintance” (293-4).  Quoting George Ripley, Holmes suggests that Emerson never “read ten pages of his great 
authorities, Plato, Plutarch, Montaigne, or Goethe, in the original.  He is no friend to profound study any more than 
of philosophical speculation” (294).  This claim of Ripley’s and Holmes’, of course, is highly dubious.  In fact, 
Stuart Brown, in his essay “Emerson’s Platonism,” contends that Emerson “read the Dialogues [of Plato] in Greek, 
since he was so scornful of those who could not; but he often browsed in Thomas Taylor’s translations and used 
them for comparison with his own readings” (328).  In addition to consulting Thomas Taylor’s translations, 
furthermore, Emerson also borrowed German translations of Plato’s works from both the Harvard and Boston 
Athenæum libraries multiple times from 1826 through 1845 (Cameron 97).  In 1828 and 1832, moreover, Emerson 
consulted Goethe’s works in their original German, suggesting a serious commitment to scholarship (Cameron 75).  
More significantly, it also suggests an effort on the part of previous generations to divorce Emerson’s praised name 
from any intellectually controversial figures, especially Spinoza.   
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ultimate refusal to join the rabbinate.  As early as 1831, just one year before he delivered his  
homily “The Lord’s Supper” and renounced his pulpit, Emerson expressed a specific interest in  
Spinoza.5   
II. Emerson’s Reinterpretation of Spinoza’s “Substance,” “Attributes,” and 
“Modes” 
 
Though Emerson does not embrace every specific assertion contained in the Ethics, he 
certainly adopts the spirit of Spinoza’s metaphysics.  Outlining the schema of existence, 
Emerson reinterprets Spinoza’s concepts of “substance,” “attributes,” and “modes.”  Associating 
God and substance, Spinoza expresses a philosophical viewpoint intricately tied to specific 
notions of “substance” and “God” that differ from any commonplace understanding of these two 
concepts.  Spinoza defines substance as “that which is in itself and is conceived through itself; 
that is, that the conception of which does not require the conception of another thing from which 
it has to be formed” (Ethics 31).  God, for Spinoza, is the entirety of substance (37).  Emerson 
expresses the same concept in his journals when he postulates that “the Universe needs no outer 
cause but exists by its own perfection and the sum of it all is this, God is” (Journals6 V 163).  
Just like Spinoza, Emerson associates the entirety of the universe—i.e. substance—with God.  
For Spinoza as for Emerson, substance or God is the most independent level of existence: both 
philosophers conceive of God as self-caused and constituting everything in existence (Ethics 34-
40). 
Attributes, in Spinoza’s hierarchy of the order of existence, represent the next highest 
level of being.  In his metaphysics, Spinoza defines attributes as “that which the intellect  
                                                          
5 In an entry into one of his pocket diaries dated November 21, 1831, Emerson wrote a note to himself in Latin 
indicating his intention to research Spinoza, among other things (JMN III 339).  I am indebted to Professor Timothy 
O’Keefe, with whom I consulted to translate this passage of Emerson’s journal.  
6 Hereafter cited as JMN. 
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perceives of substance as constituting its essence” (31).  Though God, according to Spinoza, 
possesses infinite attributes, Spinoza only considers thought and extension—what Emerson 
terms mind or the spiritual and the physical (Ethics 37).  Though not unique to Spinoza or 
Emerson by any means, thought and extension play complementary roles in both thinkers’ 
systems, for both consider these two attributes as reflective of substance itself.  Notably, 
Emerson gives an account of thought and extension most accurately described as Spinozist: 
“Every correspondence we observe in mind and matter suggests a substance older and deeper 
than either of these old nobilities” (“Poetry and the Imagination” Complete Works, VIII 9).  This 
concept embodies Spinoza’s parallelism, which entails that “[t]he order and connection of ideas 
is the same as the order and connection of things” (Ethics 66).  Spinoza maintains that each 
attribute exists absolutely independently of all others; therefore, thought, as an attribute of 
substance, gives an equally good account of God as does extension.  Thought and extension, 
however, do not depend upon each other.      
Here Emerson diverges somewhat from Spinoza’s strict definitions.  Asserting the 
hierarchical priority of spirit, Emerson claims that “[t]here seems to be a necessity in spirit to 
manifest itself in material forms” and that all physical forms “preëxist in necessary Ideas in the 
mind of God” (Nature, Complete Works I 34).  Though Emerson elsewhere suggests that spirit 
ought not subjugate or supersede corporeality, he clearly privileges it.  While this appears 
contrary to Spinoza’s insistence that one attribute “could not have been produced by another,” 
Spinoza certainly hints at ascribing to mind a causal priority (Ethics 36).  In fact, Spinoza asserts 
that “God’s intellect, in so far as it is conceived as constituting God’s essence, is in actual fact 
the cause of things, in respect both of their essence and their existence” (45).  Thus, Emerson’s 
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treatment of the connection between physicality and mind, while contrary to a strict reading of 
Spinoza’s philosophy, accords with Spinoza in many important respects.     
Emerson also adopts a similar understanding of Spinoza’s modes.  Modes, the lowest 
order of being in Spinoza’s system, depend completely upon substance and attributes for their 
existence and for any conception of them, for a mode “is in something else and is conceived 
through something else” (Ethics 31).  These modes constitute particularities such as individual 
human minds and bodies (63).  In his essay “The Over-Soul” (1841), in which Emerson 
describes his conception of God, he delineates a relation between the parts and whole of 
existence similar to Spinoza’s conception of the relationship between substance, attributes, and 
modes: “that Unity, that Over-soul, within which every man's particular being is contained and 
made one with all other . . . . We live in succession, in division, in parts, in particles. Meantime 
within man is the soul of the whole; the wise silence; the universal beauty, to which every part 
and particle is equally related; the eternal ONE” (Collected Works II 160).  Like the particular 
mode of substance, a human conceives of his existence only through his relation to the whole—
to God.  Indeed, the most fitting explanation of this aspect of Emerson’s philosophy lies in an 
investigation of Spinoza’s  account of humanity and its relation to God.   
Spinoza claims that “the idea of the body and the body itself—that is, mind and body—
are one and the same individual thing, conceived now under the attribute of Thought and now 
under the attribute of Extension” (81).  As modes of thought and extension, human minds and 
bodies “[are] in God alone and can be conceived only through God” (48).  Both mind and body, 
therefore, “[are] related to God in the same way,” and, furthermore, “the idea of God, from 
which infinite things follow in infinite ways, must be one, and only one” (80, 65).  Essentially, 
these passages accounting for mankind’s relation to God reappear in Emerson’s “Over-Soul.”  
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Every part of an individual—both mind and body—relates equally to God—“the eternal ONE”—
and God contains every human’s particular being.   
Even though both thinkers understand God as the immanent cause of everything in 
existence, Emerson and Spinoza deny any separation between substance or God and its modes or 
particles.  In two propositions, Spinoza, veraciously stating his position, posits that “[w]hatever 
is, is in God, and nothing can be or be conceived without God” and that “God is the imminent, 
not the transitive, cause of all things” (Ethics 40, 46).  Here, Spinoza asserts that God is equally 
the cause and effect.7  Similarly, Emerson understands that “[c]ause and effect are two sides of 
one fact” and asserts that everything in the universe consists in God:  
this deep power in which we exist, and whose beatitude is all accessible to us, is not only 
self-sufficing and perfect in every hour, but the act of seeing and the thing seen, the seer 
and the spectacle, the subject and the object, are one. We see the world piece by piece, as 
the sun, the moon, the animal, the tree; but the whole, of which these are the shining 
parts, is the soul. (“Circles,” Collected Works II 186; “The Over-Soul” ibid. 160) 
Like Spinoza, Emerson maintains the impossibility of isolating any part of reality from God and 
ascribes to God features that accord directly with Spinoza’s opening definitions in the Ethics: 
God is self-caused and self-sustaining (Ethics 37-8).      
III. Secondary Neglect 
These notable similarities notwithstanding, investigations of Spinoza and Emerson fail to 
acknowledge the link between the two philosophers.  Perhaps because much secondary literature 
on Emerson treats him primarily as a literary or religious figure rather than a philosopher, most 
                                                          
7 Spinoza does admit some degree of distinction between cause and effect.  Notwithstanding this differentiation, he 
does not suggest that cause and effect are constituted in different entities; therefore, he concludes that “knowledge of 
an effect depends on, and involves, knowledge of the cause,” but that “[w]hatever is, is in God, and nothing can be 
or be conceived without God” (Ethics 32, 40).   
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scholarship glosses over the more philosophical influences on Emerson’s thought.  Consideration 
of philosophical sources pertinent to his work emphasizes the influence of thinkers with literary 
or mystical leanings such as Plato, Swedenborg, and Coleridge.  Indeed, when approaching 
Emerson’s work, scholars continually raise the question, “Does Emerson remain a man of letters, 
merely, who dabbled in philosophy, or is he a philosopher who chose, as the mighty Plato 
himself had chosen, to reformulate the thoughts of his predecessors and give them an artistic 
rendering?” (Gray 26).  Though recent investigations of Emerson such as those by Stanley 
Cavell and Anthony Petruzzi acknowledge the Concord Sage as a major influence on nineteenth 
and twentieth century philosophy in America and Europe and as a true philosopher in his own 
right8, much scholarship treats Emerson as a notable literary figure but poor philosopher, 
because of the lack of formal, linear reasoning within his writings.  Norman Miller, for instance, 
says that “Emerson’s philosophy, if it is informed by a logic at all, is informed by the logic of the 
spider web rather than that of the skyscraper; it is circular rather than linear, intuitional rather 
than syllogistic . . . . Tear it at one point and the whole construct falls” (381).  Importantly, this 
description recognizes Emerson’s philosophical leanings, but it privileges more conventional 
syllogistic reasoning by presenting Emerson’s logic as circular and, therefore, vulnerable.  In his 
essay “The Romantic Spinoza in America,” Benjamin Wolfstein even denies that Spinoza 
influences American philosophy directly.  Instead, he posits that the St. Louis Hegelians, led by 
Henry Conrad Brokmeyer and William Torrey Harris, encounter Spinoza in the antebellum 
period through their readings of Hegel: “it was largely through Spinoza’s direct influence on 
Hegel that he indirectly influenced American thought” (439).  Indeed, Wolfstein fails to 
recognize any link, direct or indirect, between Spinoza and the American Transcendentalists, 
                                                          
8 See Cavell for a discussion of Emerson’s influence on Heidegger, Nietzsche, and Logical Positivism and  
Petruzzi’s for treatment of Emerson’s influence on Heidegger.    
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claiming instead that “New England transcendentalists [sic] actually brought Kant to America 
when they introduced Coleridge” (439).  In a magnificent intellectual biography of Emerson 
entitled God in Concord, Richard Geldard delves into Emerson’s journals, correspondence, 
personal experience, and published works in an attempt to ascertain and present his intellectual 
and spiritual progression.  Nowhere in this work, though, does Geldard mention Spinoza or his 
influence on Emerson.  Henry David Gray, in his Emerson: A Statement of New England 
Transcendentalism as Expressed in the Philosophy of Its Chief Exponent, recognizes similarities 
to Spinoza in Emerson’s philosophy, but he points them out off-handedly in order to accentuate 
dissimilarities between Emerson and Kant.9   
 More recent investigations concerning Emerson’s holistic cosmology and monistic 
tendencies have chiefly investigated the connection between Emerson and Plato.  In his  
“Emerson on Plato: The Fire’s Center,” Ray Benoit, describing Emerson as a “monistic dualist,” 
observes that he, “by interpreting Plato . . . chose neither spirit nor matter but viewed each as 
aspects of a ground of being, if you will, higher than both” (488).  In his essay “Poetry and 
Imagination,” Emerson does indeed insist that the fundamental unity of material and spiritual 
substance, correctly understood, points to a plane of existence higher than both: “Every 
correspondence we observe in mind and matter suggests a substance older and deeper than either 
of these old nobilities” (Complete Works, VIII 9).  Benoit, through his account, characterizes 
Emerson’s philosophy as dualistic in its notion of a two-fold reality, yet also monistic by virtue 
of Emerson’s insistence that a unity more fundamental than its composite parts informs the 
whole of reality.  This description of Emerson’s worldview, especially when considered in 
concert with many other of Emerson’s metaphysical postulations, echoes Spinoza’s parallelism 
                                                          
9 Gray, discussing Emerson’s conception of God, says, “in his recognition of ‘boundless space and boundless time’ 
as ‘the two cardinal conditions’ of nature . . . , he shows clearly that his conception was at best really Spinoza’s and 
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more closely than Plato’s dualism: “thinking substance and extended substance are one and the 
same substance, comprehended now under this attribute, now under that” (Ethics 67).  
Conveying Emerson’s parallelism even more accurately, Norman Miller remarks that Emerson 
sees nature as “a material though dynamic representation of a spiritual world, corresponding to 
that other, at any moment, part for part” (388).  Despite Emerson’s parallelism, monism, and 
recognition of Spinoza specifically in numerous lectures, essays, and journals, scholarship on 
Emerson continues to investigate his philosophy without recognizing Spinoza’s important 
influence.         
IV. The Spinoza Controversy 
From his lifetime up to the nineteenth century, Spinoza was a controversial figure in the 
philosophical world.  Debate surrounded the theological and philosophical implications of his 
metaphysical, ethical, and religious theories.  The constant controversy surrounding Spinoza’s 
philosophy lead to gross misinterpretations on both sides of the argument; as a result, centuries 
elapsed between Spinoza’s lifetime and the possibility of a dispassionate readership.  The 
seventeenth-century French philosopher Pierre Bayle wrote a lengthy article attacking Spinoza’s 
philosophy and its followers in his Historical and Critical Dictionary (1697).  Because of its 
wide readership, Bayle’s Dictionary influenced many professional and lay philosophers even 
into the nineteenth century.  In fact, Emerson borrowed Bayle’s 5-volume Dictionary from the 
Harvard library in February of 1824 and referenced it on numerous occasions in his journals 
(Cameron 45).  
Bayle’s article influenced Spinoza’s reception tremendously because “many readers came 
to know Spinozism through the summary he gave” (Moreau 3).  Bayle, in his account of 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
not Kant’s” (66). 
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Spinoza, “caricatures the doctrine by not distinguishing between natura naturans (‘nature 
naturing’) and natura naturata (‘nature natured’) and by treating the relation of modes to 
substance as a mechanical identity” (Moreau 3).10 The conflation of these two crucial concepts 
colors many of the debates surrounding Spinoza’s philosophy, including those between Johann 
Gottfried Herder and Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi and, importantly, between Andrews Norton and 
George Ripley.11  Following this misreading of Spinoza’s philosophy to its logical end, Bayle 
accuses Spinoza of atheism and fatalism.  Attacking Spinoza’s association of God and substance, 
Bayle claims, “[t]hat according to Spinoza God and extension are the same thing” (302).  Since 
Spinoza considers extension an attribute of God, Bayle reads that as equating God and corporeal 
matter.  In fact, Bayle claims that Spinoza, “along with all other philosophers, [admits] that the 
attribute of a substance does not differ actually from that substance” (302-3).  Following this line 
of reasoning, Bayle interprets Spinoza’s philosophy as materialistic atheism in the guise of 
theism.  This interpretation, however, misses a crucial aspect of Spinoza’s definition of 
“attribute.”  Contrary to Bayle’s assertion that Spinoza equates substance and attribute—thereby 
equating God and corporeality—Spinoza identifies the attribute of a substance as “that which the 
intellect perceives of substance as constituting its essence” (Spinoza, Ethics 31; my italics).  
Following his reasoning regarding the relationship between substance and attributes, Bayle 
makes similar assertions about attributes and modes: “It is . . . necessary that it [substance] 
                                                          
10 The distinction between these two terms is subtle and important.  The first term, natura naturans connotes the 
activity of growing or germination, while the latter, natura naturata, expresses nature as already created: “The 
phrase ‘Natura Naturans’ is a Scholastic term, in which the word ‘naturans’ is the active participle, ‘nature naturing,’ 
which for Spinoza connotes the active aspect of God, or nature.  Here God is described as manifesting infinite 
energy, or power.  The phrase ‘Natura Naturata,’ ‘nature natured,’ however contains the passive participle, 
‘naturata,’ signifying nature as produced and referring to the modes” (Shirley 11).  Spinoza himself associates 
natura naturans with “the attributes of substance that express eternal and infinite essence; or…God in so far as he is 
considered a free cause” (Ethics 52).  As the passive aspect of God, Spinoza understands natura naturata as “all that 
follows from the necessity . . . of each one of God’s attributes; or all the modes of God’s attributes in so far as they 
are considered as things which are in God and can neither be nor be conceived without God” (Ethics 52).    
11 See below.   
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multiply itself in proportion as incompatible modifications are multiplied among themselves, so 
that wherever there are five or six of these modifications, there are also five or six substances” 
(306).  Pursuant to this argument, Bayle accuses Spinoza of breaking the logical law of the 
excluded middle: “two opposite terms cannot be truly affirmed of the same subject, in the same 
respect, and at the same time” (Bayle 309).   Here, however, Bayle uses “substance” and 
“subject” synonymously, but this obfuscates Spinoza’s meaning.  In fact, Spinoza does not 
equate substance and subjects; rather, he describes infinite and finite modes as modifications of  
the infinite attributes of substance (Ethics 48-51).  From these few prevaricating  
misinterpretations, Bayle represents Spinoza as a systemic atheist.   
His derision of Spinoza notwithstanding, Bayle’s Dictionary gained wide readership for 
centuries after his death.  Despite the number of people who acquainted themselves with 
Spinoza’s philosophy through Bayle’s article, however, it is doubtful that many serious scholars 
accepted Bayle’s critique.  In fact, because of his unsound interpretation, “people told Bayle that 
he did not understand Spinoza’s theory and that he should get somebody to explain it to him” 
(Popkin 117).  Ultimately, though, Bayle refused to revise his representation of Spinoza, arguing 
“that there is no way of stating atheism coherently” (Popkin 117).   Curiously enough, in his 
debate with Johann Gottfried von Herder, Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi offers a similar reading, in 
which he denounces Spinoza as a fatalistic atheist.  
Jacobi and Herder represented the most outspoken and diametrically opposed voices in 
the Spinoza debate during the Enlightenment period in Germany.  Herder, a vociferous defender 
of Spinoza, responded directly to Jacobi’s anti-Spinozist and, indeed, anti-Rationalist 
publications.  Targeting much of Enlightenment philosophy, “Jacobi saw Spinoza . . . as the 
supreme representative of the tradition of speculative rationalism, which he was determined to 
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discredit” (Bell 78).  Like Bayle, Jacobi sought “to reveal that the very nature of Spinoza’s 
method and premises was inherently atheistic” (Bell 80).  Using similar tactics as Bayle, Jacobi 
rejected any distinction between natura naturata and natura naturans.  In fact, in his work Über 
die Lehre des Spinoza in Briefen an den Herrn Moses Mendelssohn, Jacobi actually defends 
Bayle against Mendelssohn’s claim that the French philosophe had misunderstood Spinoza’s 
philosophy; however, Jacobi, far from accepting Bayle’s critique blindly, recognizes its 
limitations: “Bayle did not misunderstand Spinoza’s system…one can only say that he did not 
understand . . . its foundations according to the mind of its creator [Spinoza]” (49; my 
translations).  Preceding this comment on Bayle’s article in the Historical Critical Dictionary, 
Jacobi posits that any “determinist must become a fatalist, if he wishes to remain consistent” (23-
4).  In all fairness, Jacobi’s critique involved a much more sophisticated treatment of Spinoza’s 
philosophy than Bayle ever mastered.   
Rather than equating substance and its attributes—thereby equating God with 
extension—Jacobi finds the relationship between natura naturata and natura naturans 
problematic.  Spinoza, says Jacobi, in positing an infinite, immutable substance, does not account 
for the causal relationship between it and its particular, finite, and changeable modes and 
attributes: “every particular concept originates in another particular concept and must relate 
immediately to an actually existing object, [but] the first cause, which is of infinite nature, has 
neither particular thoughts nor a definite will” (25).  Jacobi further criticizes Spinoza for his 
failure to distinguish between a cause and the thing caused: “He [Spinoza] rejected . . . all 
transient causes, secondary or remote, and posited in place of the Emanating a strictly imminent 
infinity [Ensoph], an indwelling and in itself infinitely immutable origin of the world that, taken 
together with all that follows from it, would be one and the same” (24).  Spinoza, rejecting any 
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notion of a personal God, could not explain the connection between the infinite whole and the 
particulars that follow from it; though, according to Jacobi, he simply asserted their oneness.  
Spinoza’s God, says Jacobi,  
is the genuine principle of reality in all that is real, of existence in all that exits, without 
individuality and absolutely infinite.  The unity of this God is founded upon the identity 
of that which cannot be differentiated and, consequently, does not exclude any sort of 
plurality.  Taken merely in light of its transcendental unity, however, this God must lack 
any reality that can only be found in particular entities. (45-6)   
Therefore, Spinoza lacks the means to explain any relationship between substance and its 
particular modes and attributes.  In fact, Jacobi says of Spinoza that he “should have ascribed to 
every creature two souls: one corresponding to present, particular things and one corresponding 
to the Whole” (28).  Furthermore, because of his strict adherence to a deterministic system and 
denial of any free will, Spinoza, in Jacobi’s view, advocated a fatalistic philosophy (26-7).  
Jacobi thus accuses Spinoza of isolating God from the world and adhering to a mechanistically 
fatalistic system.       
Herder fought against the destructive claims made by Bayle and Jacobi, but in his 
insistent assertions of Spinoza’s theism, Herder actually portrays Spinoza as a dualistic idealist 
who identifies God as an incorporeal entity.  Both Bayle and Jacobi attack Spinoza on his 
understanding of extended substance.  Underscoring the apparent divisibility of corporeal matter, 
Bayle asserts that “[i]f it is absurd to make God extended because this would divest him of his 
simplicity and make him consist of an infinite number of parts, what will we say when we 
consider that this is reducing him to the condition of matter, the lowest of all beings” (307).  
Responding to these claims in Spinoza’s defense, Herder makes a wholehearted attempt to 
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divorce Spinoza’s God from corporeality: “no part of the world can also be part of God, because 
the simple highest Essence has no parts whatsoever.  I now see clearly that our philosopher has 
been unjustly accused of pantheism as of atheism” (107).  Instead, Herder understands Spinoza’s 
modes as “expressions of divine force, products of an immanent eternal activity of God in the 
world” (108).  Insisting that Spinoza prioritizes thought over all other attributes of substance, 
Herder portrays Spinoza as privileging intellect over physical matter (Herder 141).    Therefore, 
Herder’s defense, in its alacrity, presents Spinoza as a dualistic idealist, who places thought 
above extension as the highest attribute of God (Bell 113).  Though this interpretation contrasts 
the spirit of Spinoza’s metaphysics as a whole, certain aspects of Spinoza’s philosophy support 
such assertions.  In his chapter “On God,” for instance, Spinoza asserts that “the truth and formal 
essence of things is what it is because it exists as such in the intellect of God as an object of 
thought.  Therefore, God’s intellect, in so far as it is conceived as constituting God’s essence, is 
in actual fact the cause of things, in respect both of their essence and their existence” (Ethics 45).  
However, Herder reads such utterances as subjugating Spinoza’s parallel claims that “God’s 
existence and his essence are one and the same” (46).  Spinoza’s claim that God’s intellect, in so 
far as it constitutes his essence, “is in actual fact the cause of things,” therefore, quite literally 
means that God causes everything.  Furthermore, Spinoza says “that which is caused differs from 
its cause precisely in what it has from its cause” (45); this iteration seems to justify Herder’s 
claim that Spinoza draws a fundamental distinction between God and the world—since God 
causes the world to exist.  In this instance, too, though, Spinoza does not separate God from the 
world.  Rather, Spinoza offers this example as clarification: “God’s intellect, in so far as it is 
conceived as constituting the divine essence, differs from man’s intellect both in respect of 
essence and existence” (46).  This distinction, however, is conceptual, not ontological.  Spinoza 
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uses this example to discourage drawing inferences about God from human traits, not to separate 
God from the world.  Immediately before this discussion, in fact, Spinoza asserts that 
“[w]hatever is, is in God, and nothing can be or be conceived without God” (40).  Therefore, 
Spinoza’s philosophy, though it contains elements of dualistic idealism—hinting at a cosmology 
that treats God as a purely intellectual entity, separate from all extended things—he does not 
consider humanity or the world as apart from God.  He does, however, discourage any view 
equating God with the world or ascribing characteristics to God based on the constitution of  
humanity.  Herder’s interpretation, therefore, incorrectly implicates Spinoza as a dualist.12   
V. Emerson on the Spinoza Controversy 
Familiar with Spinoza’s sullied name and Bayle’s account of Spinoza, Emerson 
approached the Spinoza debate with despondence.  Referencing the general sentiment toward 
Spinoza in the American landscape, Emerson made the following entry into his journal: 
In America we are such rowdies in church &state, and the very boys are so soon ripe, that 
I think no philosophical skepticism will make much sensation.  Spinosa [sic] pronounced 
that there was but one substance;--yea, verily; but that boy yonder told me yesterday he 
thought the pinelog was God, & that God was in the jakes.  What can Spinoza tell the 
boy? (JMN IX 103-4) 
A footnote to this entry indicates that Emerson had originally written “What can Spinoza add?” 
in place of “What can Spinoza tell the boy?”  This passage, particularly the original entry,  
indicates that Emerson perceiving the debate surrounding Spinoza as ludicrous.  The boy says 
that “the pinelog [is] God & that God [is] in the jakes,” an utterance reminiscent of pantheism, 
but precisely the pantheism falsely ascribed to Spinoza.  Emerson here betrays a more nuanced 
                                                          
12 For a more comprehensive discussion of how Spinoza incorporates dualistic elements into his philosophy while 
remaining a monist, see Donagan.  
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understanding of Spinoza’s philosophy than some of the Spinoza’s critics.  Indeed, Spinoza 
himself can add nothing to the intellectual, religious, and political controversies in the United 
States, because the ideas put forth go beyond any heresy that Spinoza may ever have committed.  
Furthermore, Emerson suggests that any reading of Spinoza that adopts the “boy’s” 
perspective—saying, for instance that God is a pinelog or merely some other extended thing—is 
plainly wrong.     
In a later lecture entitled “Essential Principles of Religion,” Emerson expounds upon his 
sentiment toward Spinoza: “Can any one doubt that if . . . Buddha and Menu in India, Confucius 
in China, Spinoza in Holland, could somewhere meet and converse,--they would all find 
themselves of one religion,--would find themselves denounced by their own sects, and sustained 
by these believed adversaries of their sects” (Later Lectures 273).  Emerson understood the 
fundamental principles of Spinoza’s metaphysics and religious philosophy and, hence, 
appreciated the degree to which the many in the intellectual community denounced him.  Having 
read Bayle, Herder, and Jacobi, Emerson most likely knew the specifics of the debate 
surrounding Spinoza’s philosophy.  Indeed, Emerson quotes Bayle’s approach to philosophical 
analysis: 
‘Philosophy,’ said Bayle, ‘may be compared to certain powders so very corrosive that 
having consumed the proud & spongy flesh of the wound, they would corrode even the 
quick & sound flesh rot the bones penetrate to the very marrow.  Philosophy is proper at 
first to confute errors, but if she be not stopped there, she attacks truth itself, and when 
she has her full scope she generally goes so far as that she loses herself & knows not 
where to stop.’  (JMN VI 9) 
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Immediately following this quotation, however, Emerson cites Alexander Pope in response: 
“Alike in ignorance, his reason such, Whether he thinks too little or too much” (9).  This 
commentary on Bayle suggests both an intimate familiarity with his works and a rejection of his 
understanding of philosophy.  His assessment of the current trends in religion and politics in 
America in comparison with the controversy surrounding Spinoza’s name indicate, furthermore, 
that Spinoza found the situation deplorable. 
VI. Spinoza Anathema: The Norton-Ripley Debate  
Emerson had read both Herder and Jacobi prior to the delivery of his most infamous 
lecture, “The Divinity School Address,” in 1838 (Cameron 23, 47).  Even in Emerson’s time, 
Spinoza represented an intellectual figure whose name evoked fear and hatred.13 Not 
surprisingly, then, when his controversial address prompted Andrews Norton, a prominent 
Unitarian minister, to denounce Emerson and the emerging Transcendentalist movement as 
Spinozistic and, therefore, atheistic, Emerson did not respond directly.      
Andrews Norton, in his Discourse on the Latest Form of Infidelity, draws parallels 
between Spinoza, Hume, and other secular philosophers and the emerging Transcendentalist 
sentiments.  Delivered to the Alumni Association at the Cambridge School of Theology, the fiery 
denunciation of non-sectarianism inspired George Ripley, a Unitarian minister and 
Transcendentalist, to respond.  The subsequent debate, carried out through correspondence, 
spans hundreds of pages and deals with Spinoza, Hume, and others.  Although Emerson’s 
“Divinity School Address” kindled the argument, Emerson himself never actually took part or 
engaged Norton directly.  Still, the spirit and content of the debate illustrate the divisiveness of 
Emerson’s radical religious philosophy, Spinoza’s definite presence in Transcendentalist circles, 
                                                          
13 In an 1868 journal entry, Emerson, in a passage entitled “Revolutions,” remarked, “[i]n my youth Spinoza was a 
hobgoblin: now he is a saint” (JMN XVI 99).  
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and the degree to which this perceived threat caused Norton, a once liberal minister, suddenly 
and unapologetically to reject dialogue and view Christianity as a monolith.    
While Norton, in his actual speech, concerns himself primarily with Spinoza’s  
Theologico-Political Treatise and, more to the point, with the denial of miracles, the argument 
between Norton and Ripley transformed into a debate about the proper interpretation of 
Spinoza’s metaphysics and theology.  This debate illustrates the degree to which Spinozism 
divided the Unitarian ministry in early nineteenth-century America.  The notion that Spinoza’s 
controversial metaphysics and biblical interpretation could infiltrate the Unitarian clergy, stirring 
them to question some of the basic tenets of Christian faith—as exemplified in Emerson’s 
renunciation sermon, “The Lord’s Supper”—proved most problematic to Norton and others in 
the Unitarian ministry.       
In his Discourse on the Latest Form of Infidelity, Norton refers to Spinoza as “the 
celebrated atheist” and claims that the resurgence of Spinozism undermines the truth of 
Christianity (9).  Speaking of Emerson and the emergence of American Transcendentalism  
in no uncertain terms, Norton warns that while these infidels claim to be Christians, they, in fact, 
deny the most basic tenets of Christianity: “The latest form of infidelity is distinguished by 
assuming the Christian name, while it strikes directly at the root of faith in Christianity, and 
indirectly of all religion, by denying the miracles attesting the divine mission of Christ” (11).  
Norton here refers directly to Emerson’s “Divinity School Address” (1838), in which he denies 
miracles and describes Jesus as a prophet rather than God (Complete Works I 128-31). 
 Ripley, defending American Transcendentalism and Spinozism in an anonymously 
published pamphlet called, A Letter to Mr. Andrews Norton, criticizes Norton for his 
misrepresentation of Spinoza and his message of wholesale denunciation rather than dialogue.  
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Quoting Francis W. P. Greenwood, a fellow minister and editor of The Unitarian Miscellany and 
Christian Monitor (1824 to 1826), Ripley describes the spirit of the Harvard Divinity School as 
an environment contrary to the attitude expressed in Norton’s inflammatory speech: “It regards 
spiritual pride and arrogance as worse than false doctrine . . . . Exclusiveness is its utter aversion.  
Exclusive Christianity is its unspeakable wonder.  It regards exclusive religion as quite as great a 
contradiction as an exclusive God” (9).  In fact, Ripley deprecates the harshness of Norton’s 
position based on his own record.  Seeing Norton’s position as contrary to Unitarianism and, 
therefore, to Norton’s own office as a Unitarian minister, Ripley says, “you lose sight of the 
basis of our Christian union, and advance principles which have been repudiated by our 
churches, which are at war with the spirit of society among us, and which threaten, if carried into 
effect, to disorganize and confound our dearest religious institutions” (155).  Norton’s fear that 
the ever more popular Transcendentalist beliefs spreading through the Unitarian population 
could dilute Christian doctrine beyond the point of recognition motivated his unilateral 
denunciation of philosophical positions that influenced Emerson’s credo.  Emerson was a natural 
target for Norton’s Discourse, because as a public lecturer and former minister, he represented 
one of the most well-known proponents of Transcendentalism.   
VII. Ripley’s Defense  
The debate between Norton and Ripley did not, however, focus solely on the 
inappropriateness of Norton’s fiery harangue.  Ripley directly challenged the validity of Norton’s 
interpretation of Spinoza.   For instance, Ripley contradicts Norton’s assertion that “[t]o deny the 
atheism of Spinoza, is merely to contend that the word is not to be used in its common and 
established sense” and further accuses him of equating God with nature (45, 9-10).  Defending 
Spinoza against these allegations of pantheism, Ripley insists that “[h]e was a pantheist in the 
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philosophical sense only; by this is meant that he denied real, substantial existence to finite 
objects; all apparent life is in truth the divine life” (125).  Subsequent to this assertion, Ripley 
cites multiple Spinoza scholars such as Herder and Victor Cousin in support of his argument.   
Ripley’s defense, though, actually illustrates that he misread Spinoza to a certain degree 
as well.  Drawing heavily on sources like Herder, Ripley’s apologia overcompensates in its 
defense, portraying Spinoza as a philosopher who venerated the idea of God while subjugating 
material and human existence.  Ripley quotes Cousin, for instance, as asserting that “Spinoza has 
such a deep sense of the existence of God, that he loses all sense of the existence of man” 
(Cousin qtd. in Ripley 130).  In this manner, Ripley sees Spinoza as subjugating material 
existence for a higher plane.  But this summation inaccurately describes Spinoza’s system. 
Though employed to defend against charges of atheism, Ripley’s interpretation of Spinoza colors 
him as an idealist.  In fact, Spinoza’s metaphysics uplifts material and human existence, for each 
represents an aspect of God: “All things . . . are in God, and all things that come to pass do so 
only through the laws of God’s infinite nature and follow from the necessity of his essence . . . . 
Therefore by no manner of reasoning can it be said that . . . extended substance is unworthy of 
divine nature” (Spinoza, Ethics 43).   Ripley’s defense of Spinoza, therefore, illustrates that 
throughout the eighteenth century, philosophers like Cousin and Herder misrepresented Spinoza.  
Such secondary accounts of Spinoza’s system inform Ripley’s defense against accusations of 
atheism and indicate his own tendency to present Spinoza as bordering on idealism—subjugating 
physical or extended existence in favor of incorporeal and true substance.   
VIII. Emerson and Spinoza on Religion and Scripture 
Norton’s malediction of Emerson rings true, to some extent.  Emerson openly claims that 
subsequent generations convoluted Jesus’ message and that Christianity, as a religion, had gone 
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astray from the moment of its inception, shortly after Jesus’ death.  Furthermore, in his “Divinity 
School Address,” Emerson denies miracles in the traditional sense: “the word Miracle, as 
pronounced by Christian churches, gives a false impression; it is Monster.  It is not one with the 
blowing clover and the falling rain” (Complete Works I 129).  This denial mirrors Spinoza’s 
claim that “a miracle is wrought in, and not beyond nature” (Theologico-Political Treatise 87).  
Rather than understanding miracles as acts reflecting God’s direct intervention in nature, both 
Emerson and Spinoza perceive them as affirming God’s oneness with nature.    
Emerson calls Christianity misguided in its vehement denial of Christ’s humanness.  
Seeing Christ’s humanity as the crux of Jesus’ religious philosophy, Emerson says that Jesus 
“saw that God incarnates himself in man, and evermore goes forth anew to take possession of his 
World . . . .  But what a distortion did his doctrine and memory suffer in the same, in the next, 
and the following ages!” (Complete Works I 128-9).   Jesus’ message, claims Emerson, resides in 
his estimation of humanity’s greatness (ibid. 128-9).  Obfuscating this teaching, subsequent 
generations – indeed, his own disciples—deified Jesus, thus falling “into the error that corrupts 
all attempts to communicate religion” (ibid. 130).  Advocating a recognition of humanity’s 
divinity rather than the deification of one historical figure, Emerson actually describes 
Christianity as ‘demonology’ in its exaggeration of “the individual nature . . . beyond its due 
bounds” (JMN VII 167).14  Jesus, says Emerson, rather than affirming his own divinity, 
venerated all of humanity. 
Spinoza, like Emerson, describes Christ as a conveyor truth.  In fact, Spinoza even asserts 
that only Jesus received God’s message directly, for, though God appeared to other prophets 
                                                          
14 Importantly, when Emerson uses the term “demonology,” he most likely refers to a meaning close to the original 
Greek daimon, meaning “deity” or “genius” and does not imply any of the negative connotations associated with the 
contemporary English word “demon” (“Demon”).  Thus, when Emerson alludes to Christianity as demonology, he 
does so merely to emphasize their exaggeration of Christ’s character.   
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through imagination or physical manifestation, “Christ communed with God mind to mind” 
(Theologico-Political Treatise 19).  However, Spinoza does not endorse Christ’s divinity.  
Rejecting any anthropomorphisms of God, Spinoza also rejects the possibility of God 
instantiating Himself, in his entirety, in any human form.   
Corollary to these views on God and religion, both Spinoza and Emerson treat the Bible 
deferentially, but neither accepts it as the pristine word of God.  Giving the topic particular 
attention, Spinoza, after painstaking investigation, concludes that “Scripture has come down to 
us intact in respect to its doctrines and main narratives” (Theologico-Political Treatise 197).  
However, Spinoza also recognizes “that Scripture consists of different books, written at different 
times, for different people, by different authors” (192).  In this sense, then, though he accepts it 
as a relatively accurate narrative containing valuable doctrines, he does not accept the Bible as 
God’s word in the sense of literal dictation; rather, Spinoza insists that “the meaning of Scripture 
should be gathered from its own history” (195).  Emerson expresses a parallel view on exegesis 
when, in his sermon “The Lord’s Supper,” he offers justification for refusing to perform the 
Eucharist:  
still it may be asked, Why did Jesus make expressions so extraordinary and emphatic as 
these—‘This is my body which is broken for you.  Take; eat.  This is my blood which is 
shed for you.  Drink it’?—I reply they are not extraordinary expressions from him.  They 
were familiar in his mouth.  He always taught by parables and symbols.  It was the 
national way of teaching, and was largely used by him. (Complete Works XI 9-10) 
In this passage, Emerson proposes an interpretation of the Bible in light of its historical context.  
He rejects the literal sense of Jesus’ metaphorical teachings.  
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 The crux of Emerson’s treatment of the bible, that it relays truths but should not constrict 
humanity, concords with Spinoza’s basic principles of biblical interpretation.  Emerson does not 
consider the bible the living word of God; rather, he sees it as a carbon-copy of a once-breathing 
estimation of divine truth.  To Spinoza as to Emerson, the revelation of truth is an ongoing 
process, and Emerson, therefore, berates religious opinions that insist “that the Bible is closed” 
(“Divinity School Address” Complete Works I 144).  Furthermore, Emerson dismisses those who 
“speak of the revelation as somewhat long ago given and done, as if God were dead” and points 
out that “the need was never greater of new revelation than now” (ibid. 134, 135).   Not only do 
these claims accord with Spinoza’s interpretation of the bible as “written at different times, for 
different people, by different authors” but it mirrors Spinoza’s referring to the bible as “the dead 
letter” (Theologico-Political Treatise 192).  As a consequence of exaggerating biblical authority, 
says Spinoza, “[m]en think it pious to trust nothing to reason and their own judgment, and 
impious to doubt the faith of those who have transmitted to us the sacred books”; however, 
Spinoza continues, “[s]uch conduct is not piety, but mere folly” (192).  Indeed, Emerson relays 
precisely this sentiment when he says that “Courage, piety, love, wisdom, can teach; and every 
man can open his door to these angels, and they shall bring him the gift of tongues.  But the man 
who aims to speak as books enable, as synods use, as the fashion guides, and as interest 
commands, babbles.  Let him hush” (“Divinity School Address” 135).  The crux of Emerson’s 
view on religion—his understanding of the revelation of divine truth as a continual process—
appears in Spinoza’s own account of the role of scripture within religion.  Furthermore, in 
denying miracles and insisting upon a historical understanding of the bible Emerson adopts a 
stance in the same spirit as Spinoza’s.         
IX. Spinoza and Emerson on God: “There is no personëity in it” 
 
 25
True to his statement regarding the “demonology” of Christianity, Emerson rejects the 
notion of a personal God.  Because he associates God with the Universe existing “by its own 
perfection,” Emerson sternly denies the possibility of ascribing to God a personhood: “we were 
taught that God is here no respecter of persons, that into that communion with him which is 
absolute life, & where names & ceremonies & traditions are no longer known, but the virtues are 
loved for their loveliness alone, for their conformity to God;--in that communion our dearest 
friends are strangers.  There is no personëity in it” (JMN V 163, 170).  Seeing God as absolute 
truth and goodness, Emerson understands communion with his Over-soul as necessarily 
dissimilar to any inter-personal relation.   
On the relationship between humans and God, Emerson stresses most people’s inability 
to appreciate the true nature of God.  Humans, says Emerson, “apprehend the relative as flowing 
from the absolute & . . . shall always give the Absolute a name” (JMN V 163).  Indeed, Emerson 
frowns upon the tendencies of those he calls “cultivated men,” who “when [they]  . . . speak of 
God . . . demand a biography of him as steadily as the kitchen & the bar room demand 
personalities in men” (JMN V 162).  Spinoza points out the dangers of conceiving of God as an 
anthropomorphic entity with human-like intention and emotion; referring to these views as 
“prejudices,” Spinoza says that people, “looking on things as means . . . could not believe them 
to be self-created, but on the analogy of the means which they are accustomed to produce for 
themselves, they were bound to conclude that there was some governor or governors of Nature, 
endowed with human freedom, who have attended to all their needs and made everything for 
their use” (Ethics 58).  Even denying the notion that God possesses freedom, Spinoza asserts, 
“God does not act from freedom of will”; though, he does believe that “all natural phenomena  . . 
. must be determined by God . . . to exist and to act in a definite way” (53).  Thus, Spinoza 
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accepts God as the immanent cause of all things and thinks that “[w]hatever is, is in God, and 
nothing can be or be conceived without God,” but he refuses to countenance the idea that God 
possesses dominion over the laws of nature or reason (40).  Thinking it folly to conceive of God 
as separated from nature and exercising control by displacing the laws of nature at will, Spinoza 
explains 
it is plain that the universal laws of nature are decrees of God following from the 
necessity and perfection of the Divine nature.  Hence, any event happening in nature 
which contravened nature’s universal laws, would necessarily also contravene the Divine 
decree, nature, and understanding; or if anyone asserted that God acts in contravention to 
the laws of nature, he, ipso facto, would be compelled to assert that God acted against His 
own nature—an evident absurdity. (Theologico-Political Treatise 83)  
Considering the immutable laws of nature as the laws according to which God acts and thinking 
of God as an entity without human features, Spinoza rejects any possibility of a personal 
relationship with God.  Spinoza, denying that “God has made everything for man’s sake and has 
made man so that he should worship God,” thinks it delusional to believe that God favors those 
who worship him in one way rather than another. Whereas both Emerson and Spinoza point out 
the dangers of thinking of God in anthropomorphic terms, Emerson thinks it quite natural for 
humans to “apprehend the relative as flowing from the absolute.” Significantly, Emerson refers 
to those who think of God in such terms derisively as “cultivated men,” but does not disparage 
such viewpoints to the extent that Spinoza does.   
 Given his account of the true nature of the divine, however, and his understanding of 
humanity’s relation to the Over-soul, Emerson’s theological model is highly Spinozistic.  Like 
Spinoza, Emerson understands God as the indwelling cause of all things, a force never removed 
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from nature or any aspect of existence: “this deep power in which we exist [the Over-Soul] and 
whose beatitude is all accessible to us, is not only self-sufficing and perfect in every hour, but the 
act of seeing and the thing seen, the seer and the spectacle, the subject and the object are one” 
(“Over-Soul,” Collected Works II 160).  Corollary to his conception of the unity of God and the 
world, Emerson understands God as inherent in all existence to such an extent that He constitutes 
everything in the universe.   
X. The Truth Itself 
Though Emerson’s incorporation of doctrines and ideas central to Spinoza’s philosophy 
suggests almost unequivocal acceptance of Spinoza’s system, Emerson imported Spinozistic 
ideas rather selectively.  In fact, Emerson never actually quotes Spinoza specifically in his own 
writing, and in a journal entry from 1843 he explains why:  
Swedenborg, Behmen, Spinoza, will appear original to uninstructed and to thoughtless 
persons.  Their originality will disappear to such as are either well-read or thoughtful.  
For scholars will recognize their thoughts . . . as reappearing in men of a similar 
intellectual elevation throughout history; and a thinker or a man through whom shineth 
that light which is older than intellect, and through which alone intellect is a god, will 
undervalue each reporter when he beholds the splendor of the truth itself . . . to such as 
quote their words instead of listening to the truth itself, they falsify the truth: for his book 
is not truth, but truth Swedenborgized or Behmenized or Spinozised.  (JMN VIII 380)  
 Clearly, then, Emerson understands Spinoza as a propounder of truth, but in an attempt to relay 
his own ideas most pristinely, Emerson refrains from quoting Spinoza verbatim.  Rather, he 
listens to “the truth itself” in Spinoza’s writing and incorporates it into his own philosophy.   
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The notion of recognizing the truth in philosophical theories rather than adulating specific 
thinkers informs Emerson’s attitude toward Spinoza.  In unequivocal terms, Emerson advocates 
scrutinizing readings of philosophers: “Insist that . . . whoever propounds to you an Ontology, is 
only a more or less awkward translator of entities in your consciousness which you have also 
your own way of seeing, perhaps demonstrating” (JMN V 390).  Emerson thus sees Spinoza’s 
theories as rough approximations of his own ideas, but the truth itself informs that 
approximation, according to Emerson.  Insofar as the truth concerns him, he sees Spinoza as 
simply a catalyst and, therefore, as secondary to the truth itself.  This sentiment explains why 
Emerson rarely cites him as a primary influence.  Plainly, Emerson sees the ideas themselves as 
influential and Spinoza not as the originator but as a conduit facilitating their transmission.  
 
XI. Humanity Through Natura Naturans and Natura Naturata  
The philosophical concepts natura naturans and natura naturata play a crucial role in 
Spinoza’s philosophy.  As aforementioned, confusion and debate about these concepts resulted in 
centuries of strife over Spinoza’s philosophy.  These concepts appear in Emerson’s writings as 
well; however, Emerson incorporates natura naturans  and natura naturata quite differently than 
Spinoza uses them.  Corollary to his views on humanity, Emerson associates natura naturans 
with Nature acting—natural processes—and natura naturata passive nature, under observance 
by humans. 
Spinoza understands natura naturans as “a being that we conceive clearly and distinctly 
through itself, and without needing anything beside itself” (Short Treatise 58).  Later on in his 
Ethics, Spinoza refines his understanding of natura naturans as “the attributes of substance that 
express eternal and infinite essence” (52).  Thought and extension, then, as infinite attributes of 
substance constitute natura naturans.  On the other hand, Spinoza defines two types of natura 
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naturata: general and particular.  General natura naturata  “consists of all the modes which 
depend immediately on God”; particular natura naturata, however, “consists of all the particular 
things which are produced by the general mode” (Short Treatise 58).  In his Ethics, Spinoza 
eschews the distinction between general and particular and defines natura naturata as “all that 
follows from the necessity of God’s nature, that is, from the necessity of each one of God’s 
attributes; or all the modes of God’s attributes in so far as they are considered as things which are 
in God and can neither be nor be conceived without God” (52).  Thus, in Spinoza’s philosophy, 
these two terms connote conceptual relations: natura naturans represents conceptually 
independent attributes, whereas natura naturata consists of dependent modes.   
 As illustrative of nature in itself, natura naturans, according to Emerson’s understanding, 
instantiates “the Efficient Nature” or “the quick cause before which all forms flee as the driven 
snows; itself secret, its works driven before it in flocks and multitudes . . . and in undescribable 
variety” (“Nature,” Collected  Works III 104).   This efficient nature, in Emerson’s view, 
“publishes itself in creatures, reaching from particles and spiculæ through transformation on 
transformation to the highest symmetries, arriving at consummate results without a shock or a 
leap” (ibid. 104).  Natura naturans, for Emerson, then, entails nature apart from any subject—
nature in itself.  Considering natura naturans in terms of the lifespan of Nature itself, Emerson 
stipulates “boundless space and boundless time” as its “two cardinal conditions” (104).  As in 
Spinoza’s philosophy, natura naturans consists of nature in terms of its infinite properties.  For 
Emerson, however, these include space and time—rather than thought, extension, and the rest of 
the infinity of attributes endemic to Spinozistic substance.   
 Natura naturata in Emerson’s philosophy correlates quite directly to humanity,  and in a 
manner of speaking, the same assertion holds true of Spinoza’s philosophy: since humans exist 
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as finite modes of God’s infinite intellect and extension, they constitute natura naturata.  In 
Emerson’s writing, natura naturata gets the succinct definition “nature passive”15 (ibid. 103).  
Supplementary to this definition, Emerson says, “Nature is loved by what is best in us . . . the 
beauty of nature must always seem unreal and mocking, until the landscape has human figures 
that are as good as itself” (104).  Nature passive, as construed by Emerson, becomes nature in 
relation to humanity, and in this relation, “[l]iterature, poetry, science are the homage of man to 
this unfathomed secret, concerning which no sane man can affect an indifference or incuriosity” 
(103).  Thus, though described in different terms than in Spinoza’s philosophy, natura naturata 
in Emerson’s writing takes on a similar character.  Viewed through humanity, natura naturata 
embodies nature conceived of through finite modes of Spinoza’s infinite attributes of substance.     
XII. Emerson and Spinoza on Parallelism, Dualistic Idealism, and Unity 
 His personal attitude regarding the nature of truth notwithstanding, Emerson draws 
heavily on Spinozist ideas.  In his first book, Nature, the most detailed description of his 
cosmology, Emerson imports some of the most fundamental concepts from Spinoza’s 
philosophy: parallelism, a rejection of idealistic dualism, and sense of unity.  Spinoza’s assertion 
that “[t]he idea of God, from which infinite things follow in infinite ways, must be one, and one 
only” predicates the notion of parallelism (Ethics 65).  This idea has profound consequences on 
Spinoza’s metaphysical system as a whole; however, the result of this reasoning most pertinent 
to the notion of parallelism is that “thinking substance and extended substance are one and the 
same substance, comprehended now under this attribute, now under that.  So, too, a mode of 
Extension and the idea of that mode are one and the same thing, expressed in two ways” (67).  
Spinoza, therefore, in associating God with substance, sees attributes as reflective of the nature 
                                                          
15 Most likely, Emerson draws this definition from the grammatical structure of natura naturata as the passive 
participle (see note 9).  
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of substance in manifold ways.  Thought and extension, the two attributes characteristic of 
human existence (70-1) thus constitute the same substance expressed in two different ways. 
 Emerson imports this notion of parallelism, but he eschews the rigor of Spinoza’s account 
and privileges spiritual existence.  Not committing himself to accounting for infinite attributes, 
Emerson focuses only on thought and extension: “[t]here seems to be a necessity in spirit to 
manifest itself in material forms; and day and night, river and storm, beast and bird, acid and 
alkali, preëxist in necessary Ideas in the mind of God, and are what they are by virtue of 
preceding affections in the world of the Spirit . . . . [Thus] visible creation is the terminus or the 
circumference of the invisible world” (Nature, Complete Works I 34-5).  Though he privileges 
the incorporeal, spiritual aspect of existence, this in no way mitigates Emerson’s conviction that 
the “order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things . . . whatever 
follows formally from the infinite nature of God, all this follows from the idea of God with the 
same order and the same connection, as an object of thought in God” (Spinoza, Ethics 66-7).  In 
fact, Emerson describes corporeality as dross from the mind of God, but he employs the 
metaphor to illustrate that physical matter “stand[s] as the apparition of God” and not to 
subjugate the physical aspect of existence in any way (Nature 62).  In an even stronger assertion 
more closely resonating concordance with Spinoza’s parallelistic monism, Emerson exclaims, 
“perfect parallelism between the laws of Nature and the laws of thought exist” (“Poetry and 
Imagination,” Complete Works VIII 8).  Emerson very much agrees with Spinoza in his 
postulation that both intellection and extension express God in different ways.  Like Spinoza, 
Emerson associates God with the totality of substance and all its modes of expression, but in his 
characteristically unsystematic fashion, Emerson more closely associates God with spirituality or 
intellect than corporeality.   
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Describing physical existence as the apparition of God, Emerson very nearly asserts 
himself as a dualistic idealist à la Plato.  Perhaps symptomatic of his metaphorical reasoning and 
analogical description, a certain disparity between spiritual and extended substance follows from 
Emerson’s cosmology.   However, Emerson strongly cautions against inferring any separation 
and emphasizes the shortcomings of metaphysical systems that do not regard physical matter as 
real: 
Idealism saith: matter is phenomenon, not a substance.  Idealism acquaints us with the 
total disparity between the evidence of our own being and the evidence of the world’s 
being . . . . Yet, if it only deny the existence of matter, it does not satisfy the demands of 
the spirit.  It leaves God out of me.  It leaves me in the splendid labyrinth of my 
perceptions, to wander without end. (Nature, Complete Works I 62-3) 
Emerson outlines his own conception of unity in metaphorical terms.  Insisting on the 
inseparability of spiritual and physical matter, he posits that “the Supreme Being, does not build 
up nature around us, but puts it forth through us, as the life of the trees puts forth new branches 
and leaves through the pores of the old” (Nature 64).  Spirit, for Emerson, thus constitutes the 
lifeblood of physicality.  Not simply a carbon-copy of God, corporeal and spiritual existence are 
inextricably interwoven, each representing a necessary part in the whole of the universe.   
 Likewise, Spinoza understands both thought and extension as necessary attributes of 
God.  In the second section of his Ethics, in fact, Spinoza emphatically asserts that “God is a 
thinking thing” and “God is an extended thing” (64).  In associating God with both the spirit or 
intellect and extension, Spinoza expressly disapproves of idealistic dualism.  Acrimoniously 
belittling those who “deny that God is corporeal,” Spinoza says, “they try to prove their point [by 
showing] clearly that in their thinking corporeal or extended substance is set completely apart 
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from the divine nature, and they assert that it is created by God.  But they have no idea from 
what divine power it could have been created, which clearly shows that they don’t know what 
they are saying” (40).  Here Spinoza draws on the philosophic problem of interaction between 
physical and nonphysical substances: “Things which have nothing in common with each other 
cannot be understood through each other . . . conception of the one does not involve the 
conception of the other” (32).  God, as the imminent cause of all things, must, according to 
Spinoza, share commonalities with everything caused; moreover, as substance, God represents 
everything in itself.  Separating God from corporeality, according to Spinoza, precludes the 
possibility of recognizing God as a physically causal force.  In his essay “The Over-Soul,” 
Emerson conveys the same concept.  Insisting on God’s oneness with the universe, Emerson 
says, “as there is no screen or ceiling between our heads and the infinite heavens, so is there no 
bar or wall in the soul, where man, the effect, ceases, and God, the cause, begins” (Collected 
Works II 161). 16  Like Spinoza, Emerson rejects any fundamental break between God and 
humanity or, indeed, between physicality and spiritual substance.   
 The unity informing Emerson’s thought bears striking resemblance to Spinoza’s 
conception of the universe.  For both thinkers, God is the universe as a whole and, as such, also 
supplies the primary mechanism for understanding the unity between substance’s many 
attributes.  Defining God as “substance consisting of infinite attributes,” Spinoza discourages any 
notion of disparity between what he terms the “attributes” of substance (Ethics 31).  Since 
                                                          
16 Not surprisingly, Emerson actually mentions Spinoza by name later in this very same essay, listing him as a great 
teacher who speaks “from within” (170): “The great distinction between teachers sacred or literary…between 
philosophers like Spinoza, Kant and Coleridge, and philosophers like Locke, Paley, Mackintosh and Stewart—
between men of the world who are reckoned accomplished talkers, and here and there a fervent mystic, prophesying 
half insane under the infinitude of his thought—is that one class speak from within, or from experience, as parties 
and professors of the fact; and the other class from without, as spectators merely, or perhaps as acquainted with the 
fact on the evidence of third persons.  It is of no use to preach to me from without” (170).  Later in the paragraph, 
Emerson likens Spinoza to Jesus in his conveyance of truth.  Emerson clearly sees Spinoza, along with Coleridge 
and Jesus,  as a strong intellectual and spiritual role model.   
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thought and extension constitute two of God’s infinite attributes, Spinoza maintains, they do not 
constitute separate substances (Ethics 67).  Similarly, Emerson rejects any real separation 
between physical and spiritual substances.  In fact, Emerson adheres to a theological model quite 
close to that of Spinoza, where God constitutes the totality of substance, which is conceived 
through itself: “As a spiritual truth needs no proof but is its own reason, so the Universe needs no 
outer cause but exists by its own perfection and the sum of it all is this, God is” (JMN V 163).  
Understood in light of his assertion that both corporeality and intellection hint at a substance 
more fundamental than either attribute (“Poetry and Imagination” Complete Works VIII 9), 
Emerson’s understanding of God as the entirety of the universe echoes Spinoza’s association of 
God and substance: “no substance can be or be conceived external to God. . . . Hence it follows 
quite clearly that God is one: that is . . .  in the universe there is only one substance, and this is 
absolutely infinite” (Ethics 39-40).  In ascribing to God the property of extension and associating 
the entirety of substance with God, Emerson’s conception of unity reflects a worldview 
uncannily similar to Spinoza’s.   
XIII. “Blessed Be Nothing”: Morality and Values 
 As a result of their cosmologies, both Spinoza and Emerson allude to fixed, absolute 
values, but they both also distinguish between an absolute or necessary goodness and more 
general, human notions of value or morality.  Though both thinkers understand values and 
morals as relative to humanity, Emerson approaches his notion of ethics and values from a 
different perspective than does Spinoza.  Spinoza, because of his causal understanding of the 
universe, rejects the possibility of an objective standard of goodness: “nothing belongs to the 
nature of anything except that which follows from the nature of its efficient cause . . . . As for the 
terms ‘good’ and ‘bad,’ they likewise indicate nothing positive in things considered in 
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themselves, and are nothing but modes of thinking, or notions which we form from comparing 
things with one another” ( Ethics 154).    The resultant ethical theory describes all moral virtues 
and vices in terms of human advantage: morally virtuous actions increase human advantage, 
while morally abhorrent ones curtail it.  Despite this outwardly relativistic stance, however, 
Spinoza uses the concept of God, an absolute, as a frame of reference for relative values (169).   
Defining “good” and “bad” wholly in terms of people, Spinoza says, “I . . . mean by ‘good’ that 
which we certainly know to be the means of our approaching nearer to the model of human 
nature that we set before ourselves, and by ‘bad’ that which we certainly know prevents us from 
reproducing the said model” (155).  The paragon of humanity that Spinoza describes centers on 
the idea of “power of activity” (155).  Though he considers values relative to human advantage, 
knowledge of God is necessarily advantageous and, therefore, virtuous: “the absolute virtue of 
the mind is to understand.  But the highest thing the mind can understand is God . . . . Therefore 
the highest virtue of the mind is to understand or to know God” (169). While Spinoza indicates 
that knowledge of God constitutes the mind’s highest virtue, this knowledge, from a human 
perspective, counts as good only insofar as it benefits humanity.  Humans, then, do not consider 
knowledge of God as an end unto itself; rather, through reason they understand that “the mind’s 
utmost advantage . . . is knowledge of God” (169).  More than just ensuring the advantage of the 
individual, moreover, knowledge of God, says Spinoza, leads humans to act in the interests of 
their fellows (174).  According to Spinoza, then, true knowledge of God constitutes a necessary 
virtue, but he couches the account of virtue’s moral weight in terms of human advantage.   
 Describing the transience of all values, Emerson approaches ethics from a similar 
perspective.  Though he clandestinely alludes to goodness in absolute terms—“Truth, and 
goodness, and beauty, are but different faces of the same All” (Nature, Complete Works I 24 )—
 
 36
Emerson postulates the fluidity of all human virtues and ethics with equal alacrity.  In his essay 
“Circles,” Emerson quite explicitly challenges the notion of an absolute human morality: “the 
manners and morals of mankind are all at the mercy of a new generalization” (Collected Works II 
183).  Elaborating on the relativity of values, he says that “[a] new culture would instantly 
revolutionize the entire system of human pursuits” (184).  Moreover, like Spinoza, Emerson 
understands virtue as self-preserving and evil as self-destructive.  Speaking of virtue, Emerson 
says, “Whilst a man seeks these ends he is strong by the whole strength of nature.  In so far as he 
roves from these ends, he bereaves himself of power, of auxiliaries; his being shrinks out of all 
remote channels and he disuniversalizes and he individualizes himself—and becomes all the time 
less and less” (“Ethics” 42).  Emerson’s notion of goodness accords with Spinoza’s: describing 
self-perpetuating virtue, Emerson claims that “[t]here is nothing in the world that does not 
correspond to properties in [man] . . . . If you embrace the cause . . . of mankind, all things will 
work with and for you” (42).  He further describes benevolence as “absolute and real,” asserting, 
“[s]o much benevolence as a man hath, so much life hath he” (42).  On the other hand, Emerson 
classifies evil as “merely privative” and insists that “Pure badness . . . could not subsist. It is 
annihilation” (42).  Through goodness and benevolence, then, individuals secure the welfare of 
themselves and all of humanity; however, evil begets only self-destruction.  This conception 
parallels Spinoza’s own notion of “conatus” or self-preservation as the “basis of virtue” (Ethics 
165).   Spinoza says that virtue “is the very conatus to preserve one’s own being” (Ethics 165).  
He maintains that “happiness consists in man’s being able to preserve his own being” and that 
everybody “endeavors to preserve his own being . . . from the laws of his own nature” (165).  
Crucially, though, Spinoza insists that the virtuous person “will love with greater constancy [the 
good he pursues for himself] if he sees others loving the same thing” (174-5).  Spinoza, then, like 
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Emerson, posits a “good . . . common to all, and [that] all can enjoy” (175).  Both philosophers, 
therefore, insist on a common good and, furthermore, claim that individuals’ pursuit of this good 
benefits all of humanity.          
XIV. Humanity 
 Though each thinker uses mankind as his point of reference for the qualification of 
values, Emerson and Spinoza approach humanity in radically different ways.  Emerson, 
expressing a very optimistic view of humanity in his early writings, asserts that nature exists in 
order to serve people.  Associating investigation of nature with self-reflection and reflection on 
God, moreover, Emerson unreservedly anthropomorphizes both God and nature.  Spinoza, to the 
contrary, quite explicitly discourages any notion of ascribing to God or nature human 
characteristics.   
Owing to their mutual conception of humanity as inseparable from God, both thinkers 
understand humans as having some access to God’s intellect.  Spinoza, however, adopts a more 
dispassionate view of humanity than that of Emerson.  Asserting that “the human mind is part of 
the infinite intellect of God,” Spinoza maintains that “when we say that the human mind 
perceives this or that, we are saying . . . that God . . . in so far as he is explicated through the 
nature of the human mind, that is, in so far as he constitutes the essence of the human mind—has 
this or that idea” (Ethics 70-1).  Spinoza here maintains that God constitutes the human mind, but 
he rejects the idea that the human mind accurately reflects the nature of divine intellect.  
Considering the human mind a finite mode of the infinite attribute of thought, Spinoza insists 
that “the intellect and will that would constitute the essence of God would have to be vastly 
different from human intellect and will, and could have no point of agreement except the name” 
(45).  While Spinoza acknowledges that humans have access to the mind of God, they have that 
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access, he says, only insofar as God constitutes the essence of the human mind.  Since God’s 
intellect encompasses so many more elements than does the intellect of any individual, however, 
Spinoza emphasizes the illogicality of basing any assumptions about the whole of God’s infinite 
intellect on a single, finite mode.  
Emerson, adopting a position contradictory to Spinoza’s theory of mind, enthusiastically 
encourages understanding God and nature as reflective of the human intellect.  In fact, in his 
lecture “The Powers of the Mind” (1858), Emerson expresses his disapproval of Spinoza’s 
account of the human intellect.17  The difference between their positions on the human mind  
stems from Spinoza’s strict understanding of modes and attributes and from a concept in 
Emerson that Norman Miller calls the “‘each and all’ doctrine” (381).  According to this, 
Emerson maintains that “the All is in each particle . . . entire Nature reappears in every leaf & 
moss” (JMN VII 186).  In his Nature, Emerson expresses the idea even more blatantly: “Each 
particle is a microcosm, and faithfully renders the likeness of the world” (Complete Works I 43).  
Combining this concept with his veneration of humankind, Emerson posits that “Nature is so 
pervaded with human life that there is something of humanity in all and in every particular” 
(ibid. 63).  Stressing the association between God and nature and understanding nature as highly 
reflective of humanity, Emerson thus asserts that “man has access to the entire mind of the 
Creator, is himself the creator in the finite” (64).  Emerson, therefore, understands the difference 
between human and divine intellect as determined solely by degree; hence, the human mind, 
according to Emerson, possesses all the same characteristics as the divine intellect on a small 
scale.  Spinoza, on the other hand, emphasizes that human and divine intellect differ in kind: 
because the human intellect is a finite mode of the infinite attribute of thought, “it is in 
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something else and is conceived through something else”—namely, the attribute of thought 
(Ethics 31). 
XV. Was Emerson a Spinozist? 
 Emerson drew from a plethora of sources.  Multitudes of thinkers, poets, and authors 
influenced his thought and writing.  Therefore, Emerson could not follow, to the letter, all of 
Spinoza’s philosophy; sifting through Spinozist ideas and gleaning what he considered the truth 
itself, Emerson incorporated pieces and aspects of Spinoza’s philosophy into his own thinking 
and writing.  However, the central ideas of Spinoza’s metaphysics, religious philosophy, and 
system of ethics absolutely show through in Emerson’s work.  Closely associating God with 
nature and considering the universe as an apparition of God’s intellect, Emerson quite explicitly 
incorporates Spinoza’s idea that “the truth and formal essence of things is what it is because it 
exists as such in the intellect of God as an object of thought.  Therefore, God’s intellect, in so far 
as it is conceived as constituting God’s essence, is in actual fact the cause of things, in respect 
both of their essence and their existence” (Ethics 45).  Not adhering to Spinoza’s strict geometric 
method, though, Emerson rejects many principles crucial to Spinoza’s own philosophy.  Indeed, 
Emerson does not entertain the notion that infinite attributes, in the Spinozistic sense, exist; 
moreover, he does not construct a rigid ontological and conceptual hierarchy comparable to 
Spinoza’s understanding of substance, modes, and attributes.  However, Emerson adopts a 
similar model of God as the totality of existence and the indwelling cause of all things.  His 
system of ethics, similar to Spinoza’s, incorporates a principle of conatus, ensuring the 
perpetuation of good and the unsustainability of  evil.  Furthermore, Emerson breathed new life 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
17 In this lecture, Emerson says of Spinoza that he did not “make . . . a contribution to mental philosophy,” and says 
further, in regard to Spinoza’s account of the mind, “Taking to pieces is the trade of those who cannot construct” 
(Later Lectures 73).  
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into Spinoza’s treatment of scripture.  Advocating a historical understanding of the bible and 
calling for the creation of new inspirational works not subjugated by the greatness of antiquity, 
Emerson, like Spinoza, cautioned against understanding biblical texts as the dead word of God.      
 Spinoza’s influence paints Emerson in a highly philosophical light.  As most accounts to 
date have considered his more literary influences—Swedenborg, Coleridge, and Plato—
Emerson’s writings have counted primarily as contributions to the sphere of literature.  However, 
reexamining the issue, in light of his latent Spinozism, of whether “Emerson [is] a man of letters, 
merely, who dabbled in philosophy, or . . . a philosopher who chose, as the mighty Plato himself 
had chosen, to reformulate the thoughts of his predecessors and give them an artistic rendering,” 
makes it clear that the latter characterization applies (Gray 26).  Reformulating Spinoza’s ideas 
without the geometric method, Emerson reified abstract concepts in Spinoza’s philosophy—
substance, attribute, and mode—giving them concrete meaning in a nineteenth-century American 
setting, giving them metaphorical and more accessible rendering in terms of the Over-Soul, 
Nature and humanity.  In Emerson’s writing, such concepts as natura naturans and natura 
naturata have meanings grounded in humanity; whereas in Spinoza, these concepts receive little 
practical treatment and remain quite abstract.   
  Secondary accounts of Emerson, until the latter half of the twentieth century, failed, for 
the most part, to treat Emerson as a serious influence on Western philosophy.  Upon 
philosophical investigation of his work, however, scholars like Stanley Cavell have found his 
work highly influential on the likes of Friedrich Nietzsche, John Dewey, and many others.  
Throughout his life, Emerson expressed a clear interest in Spinoza; he proximately exacted an in-
depth and protracted debate centering on the Spinozist tendencies of New England 
Transcendentalism.  And in an effort to protect him from calumnious critics such as Andrews 
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Norton, Emerson’s contemporaries and the generation following his engaged in a concerted 
cover-up by shielding him from the bugbear of Spinozism.  Whether or not Emerson actually 
read Spinoza directly is of little consequence.  Having read Bayle, Jacobi, and Herder, Emerson 
became familiar with the ideas present in Spinoza.  That Emerson considered Spinoza Plato’s 
equal ranks him among Emerson’s major influences.   
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 42
Works Cited 
 
Bayle, Pierre.  Historical and Critical Dictionary: Selections.  Trans. Richard H. Popkin.   
New York: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1965 
Bell, David.  Spinoza in Germany from 1670 to the Age of Goethe.  Leeds, Engl.: W. S.  
Maney & Son Ltd, 1984. 
Benoit, Ray.  “Emerson on Plato: The Fire’s Center.” American Literature 34.4  
(1963): 487-98. 
Brown, Stuart Gerry.  “Emerson’s Platonism.” The New England Quarterly 18.3 (1945):  
325-45. 
Burkhardt, Frederick H.  Introduction.  God, Some Conversations.  By Johann Gottfried  
Herder.  Trans. Frederick H. Burkhardt.  New York: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1940.  3-64.  
Burkholder, Robert E. and Joel Myerson (eds). Critical Essays on Ralph Waldo  
Emerson.  Boston: G. K. Hall, 1983.  
Cameron, Kenneth Walter.  Ralph Waldo Emerson’s Reading.  Hartford, CT:  
Transcendental Books, 1962. 
Cavell, Stanley.  Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome: The Constitution of Emerson’s  
Perfectionism.  Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1990. 
Colie, Rosalie.  “Spinoza and the Early English Deists.”  Journal of the History of Ideas 20  
(1959): 23-46.  
“Demon.” Oxford Dictionary of Word Histories.  Oxford: Oxford UP, 2002.   
Donagan Alan, “Spinoza’s Dualism.” Essays on Early Modern Philosophers: Spinoza ed. Vere  
Chappell. New York: Garland P, 1992.  81-94.    
Emerson, Ralph Waldo.  The Collected Works of Ralph Waldo Emerson.  Ed. Mary Anne  
 
 43
Ferguson, et. al. 6 vols. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1979. 
---.  The Complete Works of Ralph Waldo Emerson.  Ed. Edward Waldo Emerson.  12 vols.   
Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1903.   
---. The Later Lectures of Ralph Waldo Emerson.  Ed. Ronald A. Bosco & Joel Myerson.  Vol. 2.  
Athens, GA: UGA P, 2001. 
---.  “Ethics.” The Selected Lectures of Ralph Waldo Emerson.  Ed. Ronald A. Bosco &  
Joel Myerson.  Athens, GA: UGA P, 2005.  33-43.    
---.  Journals and Miscellaneous Notebooks.  Ed. William H. Gilman et. al. 16 vols.    
Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1960-82.  
Gray, Henry David.  Emerson: A Statement of New England Transcendentalism as  
Expressed in the Philosophy of Its Chief Exponent.  1917.  New York: Frederick Ungar 
Publishing, 1970. 
Herder, Johann Gottfried.  God, Some Conversations.  1787. Trans. Frederick H.  
Burkhardt.  New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1940 
Holmes, Sr., Oliver Wendell.  Ralph Waldo Emerson & John Lorthrop Motley: Two  
Memoirs.  Houghton Mifflin, 1906. 
Israel, Jonathan I.  Radical Enlightenment: Philosophy and the Making of Modernity 1650-1750.   
Oxford: Oxford UP, 2001. 
Jacobi, Friedrich Heinrich.  Über die Lehre des Spinoza in Briefen an den Herrn Moses  
Mendelssohn.  1785.  Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 2000. 
Miller, Norman. “Emerson’s ‘Each and All’ Concept: A Reexamination.”  The New  
England Quarterly 41.3 (1968): 381-92. 
Moreau, Pierre-François.  “Spinoza’s Reception and Influence.”  Spinoza: Critical Assessments  
 
 44
of Leading Philosophers Ed. Genevieve Lloyd. Vol. 4.  New York: Routledge, 2001.   
Norton, Andrews.  A Discourse on the Latest Form of Infidelity.  1839.  Port Washington,  
NY: Kennikat P, 1971. 
Petruzzi, Anthony.  “Emerson, Disclosure, and the Experiencing-Self.”  Philosophy and  
Rhetoric 29.1 (1996): 51-64. 
Popkin, Richard H.  Spinoza.  Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2004.    
Ripley, George.  A Letter to Mr. Andrews Norton, Occasioned by his ‘Discourse Before  
the Association of the Alumni of the Cambridge Theological School,’ on the 19th of July, 
1839.  Boston: James Monroe and Company, 1839. 
Rusk, Ralph.  The Life of Ralph Waldo Emerson.  1949.  NY: Columbia UP, 1967. 
Shirley, Samuel.  ‘Introduction.’  The Ethics and Selected Letters.  By Baruch Spinoza.   
Trans. Samuel Shirley.  Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1982.  1-20. 
Spinoza, Baruch. “Short Treatise on God, Man, and His Well-Being.”  Complete Works.  Trans.  
Samuel Shirley.  Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 2002.  31-107. 
---.  A Theologico-Political Treatise and A Political Treatise.  Trans.  R. H. M. Elwes.  Mineola,  
NY: Dover Publications, 2004. 
---.  The Ethics and Selected Letters.  Trans. Samuel Shirley.  Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing,  
1982.   
Wolfstein, Benjamin.  “The Romantic Spinoza in America.” Journal of the History of Ideas 14.3  
(1953): 439-50. 
 
